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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JESSE E. SMITH, BETH M. SMITH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SALLI SMITH WEST, KEN 
ANDERSON and CHARLES L. 
APPLEBY, JR., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 900277-CA 
Classification Priority 14-b 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is established 
by Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for the 
reason that this case was initially filed with the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah and transferred to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Judgment of the Honorable Dean 
E. Conder, Senior Judge, sitting in the Fifth District Court for 
Washington County, finding no cause of action on a claim for 
specific performance of a right of first refusal on the sale of 
an interest in real property in the State of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented by the appeal is whether or not an 
oral telephone conversation may effectively waive a right of 
first refusal held by multiple parties in a piece of real 
property located within the State of Utah when there is no 
compliance with the Statute of Frauds, 25-5-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
The statute that is believed to be determinative in 
this matter is 25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, A 
case which may also be of assistance is G.G.A. v. Laventis, 773 
P.2d 841 (Utah App., 1989). This case is reproduced in total as 
part of the addendum to this brief. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was brought to seek specific performance of a 
right of first refusal when the Defendant, Salli Smith West, sold 
her one-third interest in the Pah Tempe Hot Springs property 
located between Hurricane and LaVerkin, Utah, to the Defendants, 
Ken Anderson and Charles L. Appleby, Jr. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This matter was tried before the court without a jury 
on April 21, 1989. The court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, and this appeal was brought 
thereafter. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
At the trial court level, the Plaintiffs' Complaint to 
enforce the Plaintiffs1 right of first refusal to purchase 
Defendant Salli Smith West's interest in the property was 
dismissed with prejudice and the title in the Pah Tempe Hot 
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Springs property held by Salli Smith West was ordered 
vested in the Defendants, Kenneth R. Anderson and Charles 
L. Appleby, Jr. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the settlement of the estate of Elias Penn Smith, 
the Plaintiffs, Jesse Smith, Genevieve Smith, Beth M. Smith, and 
the Defendant, Salli Smith West, received title to the property 
known as the Pah Tempe Hot Springs located just north of 
Hurricane, Utah, and south of LaVerkin, Utah. (T.9, Plaintiffs1 
Exhibit No. 1, included in the addendum to this brief.) Each of 
the recipients of the property from the estate of Elias Penn 
Smith also stipulated that they would have a right of first 
refusal should any of the other recipients of the property desire 
to sell their interest in the property. Beginning on October 12, 
1985, Salli Smith West gave written notice that she was 
interested in selling her one-third interest in the Pah Tempe 
property. (See Defendants' Exhibit No. 10, T.12.) On September 
4, 1986, Charles Appleby went to Santa Fe, New Mexico, the home 
of Salli Smith West, and modified and extended a July 23, 1986, 
option to purchase the property by drafting an additional option 
to purchase dated September 4, 1986. (T.131-133.) On or about 
September 25, 1986, Salli Smith West telephoned Jesse Smith to 
inform him of her intention to sell the Pah Tempe property to 
Mr. Appleby and Mr. Anderson, the co-defendants. (T.73 and 74.) 
On or about September 29, 1986, the Plaintiff, Jesse Smith, did 
send a letter to Salli Smith West asking for a copy of the 
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Anderson and Appleby offer to purchase. (See Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 
4, a copy of which is attached to this brief in the Addendum.) 
(T.35) On or about October 2, 1986, Salli Smith West completed 
the transfer from herself to the Defendants Anderson and 
Appleby. (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 7, T.68) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The telephone conversation of September 25, 1986, between 
Salli Smith West and Jesse Smith could not convey the interest of 
the Plaintiffs, which was a right of first refusal in the 
property in violation of the statute of frauds. 
The defendants cannot claim the doctrine of merger to 
extinguish the right of first refusal in the deed from the estate 
of Elias Penn Smith for the reason that all of the Defendants 
were fully aware of the right of first refusal in the Plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF COULD 
ORALLY WAIVE OR CONVEY A VESTED RIGHT OF FIRST RUFUSAL TO 
PURCHASE AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has ruled that an 
option to purchase real estate is an "interest in real estate" 
and within the Statute of Frauds. (Coombs v. Ouzounian, 465 P.2d 
356 [Utah, 1970]) This principal has been followed more recently 
in the case of Williams v. Singleton, 725 P.2d 421 (Utah, 1986). 
The Supreme Court in the Williams, supra., decision relied on the 
language found in 25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that 
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requires a contract to sell land be "in writing subscribed by the 
party to whom the sale is to be made". In this case now before 
the Court, the trial court found 
Mr. Smith said that he had no desire to 
individually meet the offer of Anderson and Appleby. 
The Court finds, based upon the credibility of the 
testimony of Salli Smith, that during this telephone 
conversation Jesse E. Smith further assured Salli Smith 
West that he would send her a letter to the effect that 
he would not exercise his first right of refusal. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 18 
and attached in the addendum to this brief) 
The trial court also found that in his letter of September 29, 
198 6, Jesse E. Smith promised to send "a letter signed by Beth, 
Gen, and myself releasing you from our option of first right of 
refusal." (Findings of Fact, paragraph 19) The trial court 
specifically found that Jesse E. Smith did not provide the 
letter signed by all of the Plaintiffs.(Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 23) The trail court also found that the Defendant 
Salli Smith West reasonably relied on the telephone conversation 
and the letter of September 29, 1986, and closed the sale to 
Anderson and Appleby on October 2, 1986, four days before she 
sent the documents requested by Jesse E. Smith in his letter of 
September 29, 1986. ( Findings of Fact, Paragraphs 20 through 25) 
It is the contention of the Appellants that the trial 
court improperly relied on the telephone conversation of 
September 25, 1986, and the letter of Jesse E. Smith of September 
29, 1986, when the court stated in paragraph 25 of the Findings 
of Fact: 
By reason of Jesse E. Smith's oral and written 
representations, he gave up any claim he may have 
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had under his right of first refusal at that time, 
and is now estopped from asserting the same both by 
the principles of equitable and promissory estoppel. 
The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to 
apply the Statute of Frauds to this fact situation. As pointed 
out above, an option is subject to the Statute of Frauds.(Coombs 
v. Ouzounian, and Williams v. Singleton, supra.) This Court has 
held that a right of first refusal is different from and option 
to purchase because a right of first refusal is not binding 
unless the offeror decides to sell the property.(G.G.A. v. 
Laventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App., 1989) In the present case 
Salli Smith West did actually decide to sell her interest in the 
property and thereby made the Plaintiffs1 right of first refusal 
the equivalent of an option. That interest in land could not be 
conveyed without compliance with the Statute of Fratuds. The 
Utah Supreme Court has said that the purpose of the Statute of 
Frauds requirement that a grant of realty be by deed or 
conveyance in writing and subscribed by the granting party is to 
protect important matters like conveyance of realty from frauds 
and perjuries.(Guinand v. Walton, 450 P.2d 467, appeal after 
remand 480 P. 2d 137 [Utah, 1969]) In this case there was no 
writing subscribed by any of the Plaintiff's conveying their 
right of first refusal. 
POINT TWO 
THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT CLAIM THAT THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER 
EXTINGUISHED THE PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL IN THE DEED 
FROM THE ESTATE OF ELIAS PENN SMITH BECAUSE ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS 
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WERE AWARE OF THE PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT IN THE PROPERTY, 
At the time of the trial the Defendants raised the 
claim that the Plaintiffs1 right of first refusal was merged into 
the deed from the estate of Elias Penn Smith and was extinguished 
in that instrument because that deed did not reserve the right of 
first refusal stipulated by Jesse E. Smith, Genevieve A. Smith, 
and Salli Smith West in the estate.(see Plaintiffs1 exhibit #1 
and Defendants1 exhibit #8 and #9; also see T. 20-21) The 
Defendants supported their claim with the Oklahoma case of Davis 
v. Davis, 632 P.2d 769 (Okla. App., 1981) The Plaintiffs 
answered that the Utah case of G.G.A. v. Laventis, 773 P.2d 841 
(Utah App., 1989) was more similar to the instant facts. The 
trial court specifically found that the signatories of the 
stipulation in the estate of Elias Penn Smith intended the right 
of first refusal to continue between themselves as tenants in 
common and as family members after the distribution of the 
estate.( see Findings of Fact, paragraph 12) This finding of the 
court is well founded in the trial transcript where Salli Smith 
West (T.60-61), and Charles A. Appleby (T.131-132), and Kenneth 
R. Anderson (T. 139) all admitted to being aware of the 
Plaintiffs' right of first refusal prior to the option to 
purchase between the Defendants dated September 4, 1986. With 
all of the parties aware of the right of first refusal and the 
trial court's reliance on the G.G.A. case, supra, the Defendants 
cannot rely on the doctrine of merger to extinguish the right of 
first refusal held by the Plaintiffs. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because of the failure of the Defendants to show any 
compliance with the Statute of Frauds in conveying the interests 
of the Plaintiffs in the Pah Tempe property, and the knowledge of 
all of the parties of the Plaintiffs1 right of first refusal, the 
trial court's Judgment should be reversed and the sale from Salli 
Smith West to the other Defendants should be rescinded. The 
Plaintiffs should be given the opportunity to purchase the 
interest of Salli Smith West under the same terms offered to Mr. 
Anderson and Mr. Appleby. The majority of the payments would now 
go to Mr. Anderson and Mr. Appleby, with the final balance due to 
Salli Smith West, once they are reimbursed. 
DATED this 15th day of August, 1£90. ZX 
X 
JAMES L. SHUMATE 
/ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr. Michael 
D. Hughes, THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER, 148 East Tabernacle Street, 
St. George, Utah 84770, and Salli Smith West ,546 Onate Place, 
Santa Fe, New Mexico, 87501, this 15th day of August, 1990, 
first class postage fully prepaid. 
JAMES L. SHUM&TE 
MICHAEL W. PARK 
Attorney for Peititoner 
110 North Main Street, Suite F 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: 586-3879 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ) 
) STIPULATION AND PETITION 
OF ) FOR DISTRIBUTION 
ELIAS PENN SMITH, Deceased. ) Probate No. 2070 
The Executrix, Genevieve A. Smith, and all of the 
other heirs of the estate, Jesse E. Smith, Salli Smith Girard, and 
Penn Harris Smith, hereby Stipulate and petition the Court as 
follows: 
1. The Petitioners, being all of the heirs of the 
estate of E. Penn Smith, hereby Petition the Court for distribution 
of the property of the estate in accordance with this Stipulation 
hereinafter set forth. 
2. The heirs of the estate hereby agree that Genevieve 
A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, Salli Smith Girard and Penn Harris 
Smith shall each pay twenty five percent (257o) of the total 
liabilities of the estate in order to retire all debts which have 
been assessed against the estate. The case payments which 
should be made out of the estate at this time amount to a total 
of $48,557.00. The total cash on hand, includes the sum of 
$3,557.00, making the net liability payable by the estate in 
sum of $45,000.00. Each heir to the estate, therefore, is 
indebted for the liabilities in the sum of $11,250.00. 
3. The parties hereby stipulate and agree that the 
property listed in the Inventory and Appraisement and known as 
the Industrial property shall be awarded to Penn Harris Smith 
and Salli Smith Girard as tenants in common, with Salli Smith 
Girard being entitled to twenty-nine percent (297.) of said 
property and Penn Harris Smith being entitled to seventy-one 
percent (7170 of said property. 
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ADDENDUM 
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4. As consideration for the above, Penn Harris 
Smith and Salli Smith Girard agree to pay to Genevieve A. 
Smith and Jesse E. Smith the total sum of $12,250.00. Penn 
Harris Smith shall release any and all claim to the Pah Tempe 
Springs property, the Magelby property located in Pintura Utah, 
and the balance due on the sales contract between Jesse E. 
Smith and Elias Penn Smith. Salli Smith Girard shall release 
any and all claim she has to the Magelby property located in 
Pintura Utah. Salli Smith Girard shall also release any and 
all interest she has in and to the real estate sales agreement 
between E. Penn Smith and Genevieve A. Smith Sellers and 
Jesse E. Smith and Beth M. Smith Buyers. 
5. The property known as Pah Tempe Hot Springs, the 
description of which is situated in the Inventory and Appraisement, 
should be distributed to Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, 
and Salli Smith Girard, as tenants in common. 
6. The property known as the Magelby property located 
in Pintura Utah should be distributed to Jesse E. Smith and 
Genevieve A. Smith as tenants in common, and Penn Harris Smith 
and Salli Smith Girard hereby release any and all claim in and 
to said property. The proceeds from the real estate contract 
made between Elias Penn Smith and Genevieve. A. Smith and Jesse E. 
Smith and Beth M. Smith shall become the property of Jesse E. 
Smith and Genevieve A. Smith, and Penn Harris Smith and Salli 
Smith Girard shall release any and all Interest in and to said 
property. 
7. The persons who take the property described abov>, 
shall take their property subject to any and all encumbrance wiich 
may exist thereon or any and all lease, rental or other assessnent 
which may attach to that property, as of this date. 
8. The parties who take the property set forth above 
as tenants in common, hereby agree to grant their fellow tenarts 
a right of first refusal to buy their interest in said property 
-3-
in the event that tenant wishes to sell. That tenant shall 
advise the co-tenant of his desire to sell and if a bona fide 
offer is recieved from a third party, that offer must be met 
or the tenant may sell to said third party or any other third 
party. If the tenant desires to excercise the right of first 
refusal and a third offer is unavailable, then the interest 
shall be determined by an evaluation of the fair market value 
of said property which can be accomplished by the appointment 
of appraisers by said tenants. Each tenant shall appoint an 
appraiser and if the tenants are still in disagreement, those 
appraisers shall appoint another appraiser and the decision of 
that appraiser shall be final. 
9. The parties have divided the personal property 
among themselves. 
10. Salli Smith Girard and her husband are presently 
indebted to the Estate in the sum of $2,224.00. 
11. The heirs accept the accounting of Genevieve A. 
Smith concerning the assets and liabilities of the estate and 
further agree with a payment to her of an executrix fee in the 
sum of $3,220.00. 
12. All of the parties to this agreement shall be 
responsible for one-fourth (1/4) of any additional taxes or 
estate debts and same shall be paid by the heirs within 30 
days of notification of that debt. 
WHEREFORE, your petitioners pray the Court for an 
Order distributing the property in accordance with the Petition 
and Stipulation set forth above. 
DATED, this V ^ d a y of February, 1977. 
' GENEVIEVE A. SMI 
W/3HM 
S^^MT^IISD ^ ^ * ^ 
-4-
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
8 8 . 
Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, Salli Smith Girard, 
Penn Harris Smith, being the petitioners in all of the heirs to 
the Estate of Elias Penn Smith, hereby state that they have read 
the foregoing Petition and Stipulation and are aware of the 
contents thereof and duly acknowledge that they signed said 
document, 
DATED, this / day of. ^ Z\+Xs~~~~N . 1977.. 
tm HARRISvSMlTff 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this / d a y of ^ £ J : > ^ 
1977. =r 
Residi 
My Commission expires: 
MICHAEL D. HUGHES (Bar No. 1572) 
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER 
Attorneys for Defendants Anderson & Appleby 
148 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801) 673-4892 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JESSE E. SMITH, BETH M. SMITH, 
and GENEVIEVE A. SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
SALLI SMITH WEST, KEN ANDERSON, 
and CHARLES L. APPLEBY, JR., 
Defendants. 
KEN ANDERSON and CHARLES L. 
APPLEBY, JR., 
Cross-Claimant, 
vs. 
SALLI SMITH WEST, 
Cross-Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 86-105* 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court for trial on the 
21st day of April, 1989, without a jury, and Plaintiffs being 
represented by and through their attorney of record James L. 
Shumate, and Defendants and Cross-Claimants Ken Anderson and 
Charles L. Appleby, Jr. being present and represented by their 
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attorney of record Michael D. Hughes, and Defendant and Cross-
Defendant Salli Smith West appearing pro se, and the Court having 
heard the testimony of the witnesses and having received the 
evidentiary support for both Plaintiffs1 unverified complaint and 
the defenses proposed by Defendants, Cross-Claimants, and Cross-
Defendants, and the matter having been briefly argued and supple-
mented by written memoranda, now, therefore, the* Court hereby 
enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows, 
to-wit: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The pleadings were properly joined for trial, though 
a precipe for default and default judgment had been entered against 
Defendant and Cross-Defendant Salli Smith West and filed with the 
Court on April 14, 1989- Salli Smith West never filed a reply to 
said cross-claim. 
2. This case involved the Plaintiffs1 collective 
request for specific performance of a "right of first refusal" 
included in a Stipulation and Petition for Distribution (hereafter 
"Stipulation"), arising in the matter of the Estate of Elias Penn 
Smith, Washington County Probate No. 2070, and marked and received 
into evidence as Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 1 (hereafter P.l). 
3. Part of the estate mentioned in said Stipulation 
(P.l) included real property known as Pah Tempe Hot Springs, which 
is the subject matter of the case at bar. 
4. The Stipulation (P.l) was signed by Genevieve A. 
Smith, Jesse E. Smith, Penn Harris Smith, and Salli Smith Girard 
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(n.k.a. Salli Smith West) and provided as follows: 
5. The property known as Pah Tempe Hot 
Springs, the description of which is situated 
in the Inventory and Appraisement, should be 
distributed to Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. 
Smith, and Salli Smith Girard, as tenants in 
common. 
8. The parties who take the property set 
forth above as tenants in common, hereby agree 
to grant their fellow tenants a right of first 
refusal to buy their interest in said property 
in the event that tenant wishes to sell. 
5. Penn Harris Smith was not to be named as a tenant 
in common to this property and, indeed, was not a party to this 
lawsuit. 
6. Though the Stipulation (P.l) was executed in 
February of 1977, the Defendants produced the Decree of Final 
Distribution and Order Approving First and Final Account and Report 
of Administration (hereafter "Decree"), which was marked and 
received by the Court as Defendants1 Exhibit No. 8 (D.8). 
7. The July, 1977, Decree (D.8) makes no mention of the 
right of first refusal, and has attached thereto as Exhibit "B" a 
Quit Claim Deed which varies from the Stipulation (P.l) in that the 
one-third interest to be awarded to Jesse E. Smith was conveyed to 
him and his wife Beth M. Smith; and, further, said deed, as 
subsequently recorded, contains no "first right of refusal" or 
other language which would facially limit a grantee-tenant's right 
to alienate his or her interest in the same. 
4 
8. Beth M. Smith was not a signor of the original 
Stipulation (P.l) and, further, the Plaintiff Beth M. Smith offered 
no testimony at trial and gave no evidence whatsoever therein. 
9. Though Beth M. Smith received, by the Decree and the 
deed of conveyance attached thereto (D.8), an interest in the 
subject-matter property which conceivably mcikes hei: a co-tenant, 
that interest did not make her a party to the Stipulation (P.l) 
executed in February of 1977, nor to the right of first refusal 
contained in paragraph eight thereof. 
10. Insofar as Beth M. Smith offered no evidence in 
support of her position as a holder of any right of first refusal 
as against any of the Defendants, she did not give any evidence 
whatsoever to establish any support of her complaint, and, there-
fore, the same should be dismissed with prejudice. 
11. Defendants contended at trial that the right of 
first refusal contained in the Stipulation (P.l) was merged into 
the Decree and the deed which was attached thereto (D.8). In 
support of this proposition Defendants have cited, inter alia, the 
case of Davis v. Davis 632 P.2d 769 (Okla. App.). 
12. The case of G.G.A. v. Laventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah 
App. 1989) is more in point, in that the Court finds the right of 
first refusal to be a collateral agreement to the division and 
distribution of the property in the estate. In so finding, the 
Court finds that it was the obvious intent of the signatories to 
the Stipulation (P.l) that the right of first refusal would 
continue between those signatories as tenants in common and family 
m e m b e r s a t f - • ' ; * • • . . , > • < r • ,
 : . • - : ' : • _ • 
f i n d s tfnV~ * h e r e wa: . e r y e i ui i h e : i ' : n t oi t i r s t r e l u : ; . : . ;a> 
D e c r e e ana a e e d i s s u e d a n ^ a u r >nquf>rn ^ r>co! '*-d t ! v >-^ -
 r ^ t \ - / 
a i i d t h e * - ' .• • <i .-
signatorit-L ' a :
 lt- t \ :\>u<>*~ i • ; ,(* a; poorer: aT * r .; .c* . 
t e s t i f i ed r.^;r , n. -<* ,- ft-a* l - ' h» * I r * a- -^our * r ( r : t i . / + ' n a t tri< ^  
c o n s i d e r s . * • : c . . t £•;~ A C , "^^^( a n d 
t h a t s a i d r i g h t a.a a ' s a p r , ; T .. ,-n* ,v t e n a n t s , • "o~ ia .• r". g h t 
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1 l i s oi ner i n t e r e s t in and t o t h e common! y - h e 1 d p r o p e r t y . 
1 3 . The C o u r t , h a v j n q d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e r i q h t o f f i r s t 
r e f u s a l s u r v i v a l ] tin* h f c r f f1 a FT I dctni i s s u e d t h a n - u n d f i | u )
 ( I mds 
that the claims oi each ol P lamt i l f mur.t be considered. 
1 4 . As e a r l y a s O c t o b e r 1 ? , 3 ^ 8 5 , f a l l ! S m i t h Wes t g a v e 
w n t t f i rt( \ i c e t h a t s h e una » n t e i c s i e h in M'l 1 i nq he> < n e - t h i r d 
s h a r e ii H,,-> s u b j e c t - m a t t e r p r o p e r t \ n n S e p t e m b e r ' , i ' l ^ r , 
C h a r l e s L. A p p l e b y , J r wont i n S a n t a T;,< HOW Mexainaq a n d a t t h a t ; 
t j i n e d a l i i s JU Mh w^M mod ] J i ad and e x t e n d e d a J u l y ? J , 1 9 8 6 , Opt i o n 
t o P u r c h a s e , marked a s P l a i n t i f f s 1 E x h i b i t Nn, I ( h e r e a f t e r P . 1 7 ) , 
by d^-af t- - •• t \* ' r . t i u n LO P u r c h a s e < a , '* \ x < ; • 
r e c t :\« a •. . -• K>ncp and m a r k e d a s la i ^ r d d i . t s ' L x h a ; , - ; 
( h e r e a f t e r ' ''• . : ' - ni* ' M - -'' '* - - ' v : : i i d o r s a i ; a n a ' . :har ' ;p.s 
I , A pp.] r h " *" 'UK a n - ' • ^ < - - • * - . . ; * 
Srni t l I W<-5A .-. +~^  *-he . ;:, i H i - t r i a t b ' : . : o p e r t y . 
]~ f-y '"jim: ' o i I cn 1 Sa l : i "ani t h W e s t h a d r e l o c a t e d 
i n N e w T-v • . , . , . ; ) i e i: a t e d ] : y 11 I e ] e a s e 
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agreement on the subject-matter property was modest in light of the 
option to purchase the property executed in September of 1986 by 
Anderson and Appleby (D.ll). 
16. Anderson and Appleby were aware of the right of 
first refusal, and Salli Smith West represented to them that she 
would personally take care of that factual matter with those 
holding or claiming the right. 
17. On or about September 26, 1986, the Salli Smith West 
gave sufficient notice to Jesse E. Smith, by telephone, of the 
offer of Appleby and Anderson to purchase her interest in the 
subject-matter property. This telephone call was made to Jesse E. 
Smith while he was at work and is substantiated by the telephone 
records received into evidence as Defendants1 Exhibit No. 13. 
Though Mr. Smith indicated that he could not be reached by tele-
phone at his place of employment, the Court, en camera and with 
counsel present, made a call to the number indicated on the 
telephone records and was able to reach Mr. Smith's assistant, who 
indicated that Mr. Smith was out of town, but otherwise could have 
been telephonically contacted. 
18. Salli Smith West disclosed the nature of the offer 
to Jesse E, Smith, and Mr. Smith said that he had no desire to 
individually meet the offer of Anderson and Appleby. The Court 
finds, based upon the credibility of the testimory of Salli Smith, 
that during this telephone conversation Jesse E. Smith further 
assured Salli Smith West that he would send her a letter to the 
effect that he would not exercise his first right of refusal. 
7 
• •• :. a '• . < lavs subsequent t, ..:;•; :.o.^-
phone call, Jesse fa M i , 1 a -~-* ,; letter dated September ;'-. :9H'-., 
marked a ^ ^ ivo: ini . v* i^ r * '*< * " No. 4 
(hereaf:-, . . . , ^ . .'\ .a a; . :ii,<:-: . n^ t 1 at as * *ecelpt 
of a sopy * Anderses and Anplebv', ": tr I'lirc:,.:: ' ''it- property 
1 1 € V • . -" i > - • . v . . • . -t 1 f 
r e l e a s i r . u ;u ; ; • - ^ a oj. t i a. : j i i s t i i q h i I ^ ' U S - T !l 
f a 1 ; S m i r } \v« ' - ^ ! i or - , . r i t t e n 
r e p r e s e n t • : . < , ^< .. I "I» I1 e l a 
tc_ e x e r c i b - t.hf • l r o p r i ~s t , • - r c h a s c at . i t . : *-:jt * M s u r , o c t -
n ^ r e r p a - - o r r ' -r-><-w-or ,
 P , . ts- , f . | SimsUi W e b t w. 
» i " i • f ; . < ! . • a n o p o n J p s s e 1 
o r a l --nd a t r a p r e p r e s e n t a t : e n s v/^s; re i s o n a b l e . 
r ' <JL a b o u t I ' o b e i ' .: ' , 
t o q e t h e r v A IA .^r^on a r , At.. . e h v , - <. i i t t t , t h t - < h - a , . a a , t ae. 
r e a l e s t a r « o p t : a b e r o r e T ( ^ r r a T i t l e - C< r p a s r a a s _ G e o r j e , ^ L a h , 
2 2 , S a M ; S A A t s V - A . , •• .. u * i e r a i t r d C r t o l a - r 1 ^ 8 6 , 
v;bi '_ii A m a r k e d A ~ S r c - c a i v r - j n t o r v . i o i ^ e a* P^aa. ^ t i f f- ' K > A b-1'*" 
l e t t e r o f S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 8 6 ( P . 4 ) . 
23 , J o s s * - > * ^ , • ) p*a - • - ' i a a - s -o i ' >' ' . * h a L 
S a ] ] 1 Smj t ! i • r , |
 : : tr . • . . • - o n 
S e p t e m b e r 2 6 , 19? t , a I sr iss;< i n WT : r a s o P«~-ptemb<-T . . A- < 
( P . 4 ) , i u w e v e r , f + ' > r c"> ] 1 : "mi Mi v.. • • q . a a J e s s e 1 ' 
i n l o r n t f i t \ o n r e q u * • ' - a v 4 ,. - a i ;• . HAA : A :d n o t : r A : O I i IA-
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promised letter to Salli Smith West, contrary to both his oral and 
written representations. 
24. By letter dated October 13, 1986, marked and 
received into evidence as Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 6, Jesse E. Smith 
avoided sending the promised letter waiving the right of first 
refusal and instead stalled the sending of that letter by request-
ing documents which the Court finds irrelevant to the right of 
first refusal as contained in the Stipulation (P.l). 
25. By reason of Jesse E. Smith's oral and written 
representations, he gave up any claim he may have had under his 
right of first refusal at that time, and is now estopped from 
asserting the same both by the principles of equitable and promis-
sory estoppel, 
26. Salli Smith West, in reliance on the representations 
made by Jesse E. Smith, consummated the sale and put herself in a 
position of jeopardy by his subsequent conduct, which conduct 
breached and reneged on the promises made both orally and in 
writing to her. 
27. The July 23, 1986, option (P. 17) need not have been 
communicated to the Plaintiffs because the same was not accepted 
in its form by Salli Smith West, and, as a result, there was no 
need, by reason of the original Stipulation (P.l), to communicate 
that offer to her other co-tenants. As Judge Greenwood stated in 
the G.G.A. case: 
A right of first refusal to purchase 
property is different from an option in that 
a right of first refusal is not binding unless 
the offeror decides to sell the property, 
[G.G.A. v. Laventis, supra,] 
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2 8 . The - ( " i l l S|KM J l n : a ! l y l i r u l s I h i t S . t J U ' i ini l i West 
d i d n o t d e c i d e t o s e l l t h e p r o p e r t y u n d e r t h e J u l y ; M , 1 9 8 6 , 
o p t i o n . 
c o r p o r a t e f
 ( v\;-v. r : .1 i iv*-1 ecmds a r . - - - i i V ' - ' o - . n r . e r e r t 
: ii ; o se t : p r f -" i ,^ t p r p ^ ^ n e r t y t o s a i d u o r p o i a t i o n uy W d i i d n i ."< • 
. i. 
. Mc'jnci t h i s eons/, \ \ ;no- , Gei - n e e v r A- l'::\v: ^ o a s e d 
+- o i )f- a / •< t on r • * * * * * • * * . * -1' 
, < ^  • - • • * . , ; . . • . -
 f . - r ! i ^ : t ^ J M , : . i 
first re1r,.,a] I'pcauso she lo r , + v.,v - H I _ c r p o i a t x ^ ^ a ; ^ r h ^ r 
t h e n g t r 1 * : : * - • • ,-
fje : : n l r . ; * u s i . r e l u s u l b - l o n a e d t . . ' e - r r r . a n t e 
a s s p e c I f i e d in t h e S t ipuJ a t i on ( P . 1 ) and was meanf t.c> he a f < i m i I y 
r i g 1 1.1 t o < 51 I 1: j t j e !:: I: I e g i: a i I t e e s i 11 l d e i: t: 1 i E D e c r e e (D,. 8) t c h o 1 d t h e 
property as part of the fami ly In the event any one of them 
intended to se] ] 
• : e . - . , >~ nev''<=>ve A. S m i ^ h v:i^ no 
]crr:er a < ' j - t e n a n * <-nd si '-- e i e nei. e ;e : ;ie r : o h : *" ".- ; j f r " 
h e r - f i t r * *e~ •: * sS * i r s i r e l u s a j • • - • • 
* •. • : e . e e < : t o p u r s u e t h < I l i e . S . . 
e r r i-ii .- : s 4i s e p a r r e l t - ^ a l e r r i t ! l u t a c t 
tha+- f - e n e v i e v p r ; ' r • t h -. ' * • * . , . ! . , •. • a -
")es n o r o j t ; * ... . u r ; , r ; . n : L e r e m J ^ G I . J t r s ' r y y 
<.ins r p n e v h ..-- A . r n i + r i r n< <sne< » . e *<••-..«• ' A.^  a i < ^  : ! " +~he 
Cc " • **-* . , T; - a n e _ \ e . s h e 
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had no standing to assert the same at the time of trial. 
34. Beth M. Smith was not a party to the Stipulation 
(P.l), and cannot claim any rights under it. Furthermore, the 
position of Beth M. Smith cannot be ascertained by reason of her 
failure to offer any testimony or evidence at trial and by reason 
of the fact that the complaint stands unverified in the file. 
35. Upon being sued, Anderson and Appleby, by reason of 
the Warranty Deed marked and received into evidence as Defendants1 
Exhibit No. 1, requested defense of their title from Salli Smith 
West. 
36. As the Court has ruled for the Defendants Anderson 
and Appleby, affirming their title to Salli Smith West's former 
interest in the subject-matter property, the cross-claim of 
Anderson and Appleby for indemnification for their attorney's fees 
in defending the title as received under the Warranty Deed (D.l) 
from Salli Smith West should, likewise, be denied and dismissed. 
37. Defendants1 attorney, Michael D. Hughes, offered 
testimony, which testimony is uncontroverted, that the attorney's 
fees in defending this matter were $6,500.00 through the date of 
trial, and Hughes was thereafter instructed by the Court to prepare 
further pleadings in conformity to this Court's memorandum deci-
sion. 
38. Costs in defending the suit, however, should be 
awarded to the prevailing Defendants Anderson and Appleby. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff Beth M. Smith has no standing to bring the 
11 
Instant cause ol ,ii t ton nqfi i nut Hef ends t it •, MI iti.it snr w.r not a 
siqnor to the original Stipulation, and she filed no affidavits n< >r 
offered no testimony in support of her complaint As a resul t 
thereof, Beti i ' • ,, • .. !f ; i..i: ((:m. : 
be dismissed win: piojudice. 
2. !V?>:via' * • .,-,.<-.,,. .-pr.v f Saiii s • 
rel i ed, t< : I: ler * • . . ~. i 'ten ^pres'i.t;: ..on^ 
of Plaintiff Jess- r-  Smiis . "'ivev;! tin' cropertv {- Aruv rson 
and Appleby , -^<- • result Lherrru
 vu~
 v
 - *'"!•' / 
tin- pi i nc iples • ; . •. rdssory ant . jur,.:L «.- esi-pp<i.if from asserting 
any claim to ex<uoist- his i <;:; ^i i ru retusaj which he agreed 
to waive and which ay; ci N , ' iy Su 1 1 i sniith 
West, 
3. The right of fi rst refusal was held by co-tenants 
who were rnernb- • - • • :i . . : noon 
termination of ^U.KA 'ev»> / : m i u r s c- -i* nd^r . the i lots a: first 
refusal held by Genevieve A. Smi th was a 1 so term.i nated , 
4. Tlv qr.intt^ coiporation ut Plaint if J Genevieve A. 
Smith is a different Kqai entity than the individual, and 
Genevieve A Smith had no st andinq 1M In i nq suit has* d u] ''in the 
riqht <q t i i si lelusaJ where she had, prior to trial, conveyed her 
interest in and to the subject-matter property to a Nevada corpora-
tion. 
5 ..its1 complaint r^rj 1^ be dismissed with 
prejudice with costs *: !;eiend.:ur^ . 
6 . i . in f o i a v a 1 i d t i 11 e, 
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Defendants Anderson and Appleby are not entitled to reimbursement 
of attorney's fees despite the issuance of a Warranty Deed to them 
by Salli Smith West and despite her representations that she would 
take care of the right of first refusal. 
7. A judgment in accordance with the foregoing findings 
of fact and conclusions of law should be entered and formally 
executed by the Court. 
DATED this 5 day of J^mi^ry, 1990. 
DEAN E. CONDER 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was 
placed in the United States mail at St. George, Utah, with first-
class postage thereon fully prepaid on the ~7 ^ - day of gLa4^uary7/ 
1990, addressed as follows: 
Mr. James L. Shumate 
P.O. Box 623 
Cedar City, Utah 34720 
Ms. Salli Smith West 
546 Onate Place 
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87c501 
H e n d e r s o n * N eu a d a 
Sept. 29 1336 
Dear Sal W, 
i have been unable to taIK with Gen a.bout, the 
SPrin9s. She had t-o taKe so rue hor ses to the 
coast and 1 do r iot Know for • si w -e when she wil 1 be 
bacK. I don *" t thi i nK she can come uP w 11h a.r iV 
money at the Present time because she is in a big 
] aw suit in Phoeni x ar id is also be in 9 hour ided by 
the I.R.S. over Mountain Shadows., I can not 
hand1e $ 125,©0©.©9 by my se1f. 
I- * IJ] II need from you is a copy of their 
o — ^ • bu- PI..I.-* y 3i9ned b* 1 • .ei. -.ud 
not Cjr ;,: < * * * ' '-- - * .  *--<_- ^ g r e < ••» •* -"" . 
I wi 11 -j' *e you a letter z. : 9ned by &*--• + h -en Hnd 
myself -^leasing you from our oPf-irv -* <•" -. + 
ri9hi 
Uncpr * v -v . 
CO"" t ~y 1 - -• "" *" ' *~'U'>' * * l i*- f 1 c-t"^ f ©L M y ' ' l * * -^ r 
f r o m flPPleby * H-i-->-i ?<:•'• ma l o o k *>oc " b - ^ 
t h i n K i t is t • -»_•.., \-<~.\.**- --. : <* I.-.-.,'1 * * - . i - * i u r e 
t h a n 4 ^ ^ a r s * o 9 e t M , *
 f j- <i .*- ' ~ * • * u t 
i n t e r e y f r o m "on* r- .*> « - v - • , • * 
1 .-! s u r e Pt-p , <-r<! ^ <-'»o^r_.on I - J I I . <-<>- * • me 
ar id Ger \ c _ .e * 1 >=** 4. er V > ' ' P e t -'oo* * a r t , 
w i l l r\B^d s o m e d o c u m e n t . * 4 > _ ' , , * * - *>r * r ne' 
P s >'* o u rn a. > • o i rn a. y n o t K r i o w a. r i o t f e i to buy 
rea. 1 P roP erfy must be made i n ur 11 i n9 and s i 9ned 
to be u a. lid under Utah 1 a.w. 1 rnust f ia.ue t h i s 
document.a.t i ori i f i t becornes nessesa.ry to ha.ye an 
a.PPra.is al a.t a. la.t er time. Please get this out 
to me soon. 
LoMe 
your Lirot her 
J ^ -;:., <=, p, 
:opy : 
Gen Smith 
.MiKe._Pa.rK. 
file 
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I EXHIBIT 
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m. 
generally, a juror affidavit can only be used 
mpeach a jury verdict when: 1) the verdict 
> determined by chance or bribery, Rose-
f v. Sullivan, 616 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 
3); Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 304 
ah Ct. App. 1987); or 2) when "extraneous 
judic ia l information was improperly 
mght to the jury's attention or an outside 
luence was improperly brought to bear 
3n any juror." Utah R. Evid. 606(b); State 
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988); Hillier, 
) P.2d at ^ 304. The reason for nar-
;vly limiting the circumstances under which 
•y affidavits can be used to impeach a jury 
rdict is that otherwise, litigants would obtain 
•or affidavits on "all manner of things" and 
t process would become interminable and 
practicable. Wheat v. Denver & R.G.W.R. 
x, 122 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932, 937 (1952). 
irther, "[s]uch post mortems would be pro-
ictive of no end of mischief and render 
rvice as a juror unbearable." Id. 
In State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 
>88), the Utah Supreme Court considered 
hether a juror's affidavit regarding a divine 
velation could be used to impeach the jury's 
jrdict under Utah R. Evid. 606(b). In DeMille, 
juror affidavit stated that one juror 
Jegedly told another juror during deliberat-
>ns that she had prayed for a sign during 
osing argument as to DeMille's guilt and 
laimed to have received a revelation that if 
efense counsel did not make eye contact, 
)eMille was guilty. Defense counsel did not 
lake eye contact and DeMille was found 
uilty. 
In .reviewing whether the juror affidavit 
hould have been admitted under Utah R. 
:vid. 606(b), the court stated that construing 
'outside influence" to include responses to 
>rayer could well infringe upon the juror's 
eligious liberties. Id. at 84. The court stated 
hat as long as the juror can fairly weigh the 
evidence and apply the law to the facts, the 
luror's decision cannot be challenged on the 
ground'that the juror reached the decision by 
aid of prayer. Id. Accordingly, the court held 
that under Rule 606(b), prayer and supposed 
responses to prayer are not included within the 
meaning of the words "outside influence." Id. 
The court also noted, however, that a juror 
might be disqualified from service if he or she 
is unable to fairly consider the evidence- and 
properly apply the law due to oracular signs. Id. 
The court then found that this fact did not 
save DeMille's challenge to the verdict for two 
reasons. Id, First, the affidavit did not aver 
facts which would disqualify a juror. Second, 
even if the affidavit averred such facts, the 
court stated, 
[a] claim that a juror is so affected 
by religious conviction as to disqu-
alify him or her from service does 
not fall within these exceptions 
[Rule 606(b)]; rather it goes to the 
• fitness of the person to serve on the 
jury, a matter that could and 
should have been raised at voir dire. 
Id. at 85. 
Applying the law to the facts in this case, 
we need not reach whether the affidavit 
alleged facts that would disqualify any juror 
because, according to DeMille, juror affidavits 
regarding divine revelations do not fall within 
the exception set forth in Rule 606(b). There-
fore, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
excluding the juror affidavit. 
1
 We have examined the other issues raised in 
this appeal and conclude that those issues are 
without merit. Affirmed in part and reversed 
in part. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge; 
This case involves real property occupied by 
G.G.A., Inc., doing business as a Wendy's 
Old Fashioned Hamburgers restaurant, located 
at about 550 East 400 South in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Toula Leventis (Leventis), who leased 
the property to G.G.A., appeals from the trial 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
court's summaiy iiidgmciii in fa\ u ol 
G.G.A., claiming that her notice to G.G A of 
an offer to purchase the property for $210,000 
did not obligate her to sell to G.G A. for that 
price G.G A., however, contends that Levc 
ntis's communication of that offer to G G.A 
created an irrevocable option in its favor. We 
affirm on the basis that G.G.A. had a right of 
first refusal for ninety days after notice of the 
offei 
In 1977, Leventis leased the subject pi open > 
to G.G.A., which constructed a Wendy's Old 
Fashioned Hamburgers restaurant on the 
premises and commenced doing business. The 
parties' lease provided, in Article XIV entitled 
Option to Purchase and Right of First 
Refusal, that after the expiration of the initial 
twenty-five year term of the lease, G.G.A. 
would have an option to purchase the property 
for an agreed upon price or at market value, 
to be determined by three appraisers The 
second paragraph of Article XIV stated that 
Landlords further covenant and 
agree thai in case Landlords shall at 
any tune dunng the term ol this 
lease intend or desire to sell Land 
lords* estate in the demised prcni 
ises, 01 it Landlords shall receive \ 
bona fide offer to purchase said 
demised premises, Landlords shall 
first notify Tenant of such desire 
and intent or of such offer and the 
price at which and the terms upon 
which Landloids are willing to sell 
such estate 1 hereupon, - Tenant 
shall have the option, to be exert 
ised within ninety (90) days aftei 
receipt by Tenant of written notice 
from the Landlords to elect to 
purchase the demised premises *\\ 
for such price and upon such stated 
terms and conditions. 
Finally, the lease provided that in the event of 
litigation due to breach, the successful party 
would be entitled to reasonable attorney fees 
and costs. 
On September 9, 1986, Leventis received an 
offei to purchase the premises for $210,000 
from Jimmy P. Brown. On September 15, 
1986, Leventis notified G.G A. of the offer 
and enclosed A topy of Brown's earnest 
money agreement. In early October, prior to 
October 28, 1986, Phillip Arlt, on behalf of 
G.G.A., orally advised Leventis that G.G.A. 
would exercise its option to purchase the pre-
mises for $210,000 On October 28, 1986, 
Leventis wrote G.G.A a letter stating that 
Brown had withdrawn and rescinded the offer. 
The letter also stated, "I do want to sell my 
property and will entertain new offer(s) to sell 
it; accordingly I do not consider myself bound 
to sell at the price of $210,000." 
On November 20, 1986, Leventis received an 
offer from Janus and Associates to purchase 
the property for $250,000 and informed 
G.G.A. of the offer the following day. On 
December 6, 1986, ( I O A wrote Leventis a 
lrttei offering $210,0<X) toi the property. 
Leventis icfused to sell the property for ' 
$210,000. On February 6, 1987, G.G.A. init-
iated this action against Leventis, alleging that 
G.G.A. was entitled to specific performance 
and claiming it was entitled to an injunction to 
prevent Janus and Associates from purchasing 
lhe property G G.A. paid Leventis $250,000 
tor purchase of the property and specificall> 
stated that it reserved its right to purchase the 
property for $210,000. Closing of the sale and 
purchase took place on February 27, 1987. 
The warranty deed stated that Leventis conv-
eyed the property for "ten dollars and other 
good and valuable consideration." After the 
property was purchased, G.G A. amended us 
complaint against Leventis to include a cause 
of action for breach of contract and to 
enforce the $210,000 purchase price. 
Both G.G.A. and Leventis filed motions lor 
summary judgment. The trial court granted 
summary judgment for G.G.A. and awarded it 
principal, costs and attorney fees in the 
imount ol $44,792.75. Leventis filed this 
ippeal raising the following issues: 1) Did 
delivery and acceptance of the warranty deed 
i onstitute a merger and thereby extinguish 
G.G.A.'s rights under the lease? 2) Did Lev-
entis's September 15 letter constitute an irre-
i ocable option or a right of first refusal? 3) 
Did the trial court err in awarding G.G.A. 
jltorney fees and costs tinder the lease? 
MERGER 
I event is asserts that her dcliveiy ol the 
warranty deed and G.G.A \ acceptance, 
< onstitute merger of the lease into the deed, 
thus extinguishing G.G.A's rights under the 
lease. As a result, Leventis claims, (3 G A. 
cannot assert the parties' lease as the basis for 
this action. 
I he doctrine of merger provides that upon 
delivery and acceptance of a deed, the provi-
sions of the underlying contract for the con-
veyance are deemed extinguished or supers-
eded by the deed Sccor v Knight, 716 P.2d 
790, 792 (Utah 1986) However, there are 
several exceptions to this doctrine, including 
fraud, mistake and the existence of collateral 
rights in the contract of sale. Id. at 793. 
Under the collateral rights exception, "if the 
original contract calls for performance by the 
seller of some act collateral to conveyance of 
title/' his obligations under the original cont-
ract are not extinguished. Stubbs v Hemmert, 
<67 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1977). Whether the 
terms of the contract are collateral depends to 
a great extent on the intent of the parties Id. 
The court applied the collateral rights excep-
tion in Stubbs, and found that the parties had 
entered into an agreement collateral to the 
conveyance of the real property, to the effect 
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the seller of the property could remove 
in equipment from the building. After 
g that the parties' testimony indicated 
they clearly intended to allow plaintiff to 
ter the property and retrieve his equip-
after the deed was delivered, the court 
i that the agreement regarding retrieval 
le equipment was collateral to the deed 
eying the property, 
this case, G.G.A.'s attorney wrote a 
to Leventis's attorney on February 17, 
stating that G.G.A, was exercising its 
>n to purchase the property for $250,000. 
ever, the letter also stated that G.G.A. 
ved that it had timely exercised its option 
irehase the property for $210,000. Finally, 
;tter stated, 
You are further notified that GGA 
hereby specifically reserves all of its 
rights and remedies under the terms 
of that certain Real Estate Ground 
Lease and specifically, but not by 
way of limitation to, the rights and 
remedies provided for in Article 
XIV and further reserves all of its 
rights and remedies under the Sep-
tember 15, 1986 option and GGA's 
timely exercise thereof. 
n February 27, 1987, G.G.A.'s attorney 
e another letter to Leventis's attorney 
irming that Leventis and G.G.A. were 
•ving all claims, rights and defenses in the 
uit and nothing in the closing was to be 
preted as. waiving those claims and defe-
. The letter specifically stated that G.G.A. 
not relinquishing its right to purchase the 
>erty for $210,000. Leventis did not 
ond to either letter nor otherwise manifest 
intention inconsistent with G.G.A.'s 
•ess reservation of rights, 
pplying the doctrine of merger and the 
ateral rights exception to the present case, 
find that these letters manifest a clear 
nt to preserve the rights set forth in the 
e, notwithstanding delivery of the deed. In 
ition, similar to Stubbs, the collateral 
ter of interpretation of the lease was 
rly a question to be resolved after closing 
delivery of the deed. Therefore, we hold 
the lease was an agreement collateral to 
conveyance of the real estate, and delivery 
he deed did not extinquish G.G.A.'s rights 
ter the lease. 
PTION TO PURCHASE OR RIGHT OF 
FIRST REFUSAL 
Ve now turn to Leventis's claim that the 
1 court erred in granting summary judg-
nt in favor of G.G.A. Leventis claims that 
letter of September 15, 1986, informing 
3.A. that she had received an offer to 
chase the property for $210,000 from 
imy P. Brown, did not create an irrevoc-
e option to purchase the premises. Conve-
Jv Rep 65 0_/ 
rsely, G.G.A. contends that Leventis's letter 
triggered an irrevocable option exercisable 
within ninety days, to purchase the property 
for $210,000. 
In reviewing the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment, we liberally construe the 
facts and view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion. 
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P. 2d 
750, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Further, 
because summary judgment is granted as a 
matter of law, we are free to reappraise the 
trial court's legal conclusions. Atlas Corp. v. 
Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 
1987). 
In interpreting a contract, we determine 
what the parties intended by examining the 
entire contract and all of its parts in relation 
to each other, giving an objective and reaso-
nable construction to the contract as a whole. 
Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 
(Utah 1982). The cardinal rule is to give effect 
to the intentions of the parties and, if poss-
ible, to glean those intentions from the cont-
ract itself. LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. 
Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). Additi-
onally, a contract should be interpreted so as 
to harmonize all of its terms and provisions, 
and all of its terms should be given effect if 
possible. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
The focal point in this case is whether in 
light of the underlying lease provision, Leve-
ntis's letter effectuated an option or if it 
created a right of first refusal which was open 
for ninety days. An option to purchase prop-
erty is a contract in which the owner of the 
property sells to the optionee the right to buy 
the property in accordance with the terms and 
conditions specified in the option. Spokane 
School Dist. No. 81 v. Parzybok, 96 Wash. 2d 
95, 633 P.2d 1324, 1325 (1981). A right of 
first refusal to purchase property is different 
from an option in that a right of first refusal 
is not binding unless the offeror decides to sell 
the property. 11 S. Williston, Contracts 
§1441A, at 949-50 (3rd ed. 1968); North-
west Television Club, Inc. v. Gross Seattle, 
Inc., 26 Wash. App. I l l , 612 P.2d 422, 425 
(1980). A right of first refusal limits the 
owner's right to dispose of his property by 
requiring him to first offer it to the party who 
has the right of first refusal. 11 S. Williston, 
at 949-50. 
Article XIV of the parties' lease, entitled 
"OPTION TO PURCHASE AND RIGHT OF 
FIRST REFUSAL/ contains two paragraphs. 
Although the first paragraph is not applicable 
in this case, interpretation of that paragraph 
assists our interpretation of paragraph two, 
which is the pivotal provision in this case. 
Paragraph one states that at any time during 
the term of the lease, the tenant has an option 
to purchase the premises. If the tenant notifies 
the landlord of its intent to exercise that 
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option and the parties are unible to igrtt. 
upon a price three appraisers will bt selected 
to determine the fan market valut of th 
property After that value is determined th 
tenant has sixt) days to elect to pun hast th< 
property In confi i f par ignph (w pioudc 
thit 
Landlords further covenant and 
agree that in case Landlords shall at 
any time, during the term of this 
lease receive a bona fide ofler to 
purchase said demised premises 
Landlords shall first notify Tenant 
oi such desire and intent or of such 
offer and the price at which Land 
lords are willing to sell such estate 
Thereupon, Tenant shall have the 
option, to be exercised within nmetv 
(90) days after receipt by Tenant of 
written notice from the Landlords 
to elect to purchase the demised 
premises If Tenant exercises said 
option withm said ninety (90) day 
period of time, the cl6sing of the 
purchase and sale shall be consu 
mmated with reasonable promptness 
thereafter If Tenant shall not e\e 
rcise said option landloicis shall 
have the right to conclude a sale 
howevei the Tenant's option i 
purchase aforesaid and Tenant s 
right of firsi refusal as herein con 
tamed shall remain in force and be 
b inding upon any subsequen 
owners 
(Emphasis added) 
Paragraph one describes an option tc pin 
chase the premises^and the method for deter 
mining the price The facts of this case indi 
cate, however, that the parties were not ope 
rating under the provisions of paragraph one 
oi Article XIV, because the tenant, G G A , 
did not initiate the discussion regarding pure 
hase of the property and the price was set by a 
third party rather thin b\ th( parties <r three 
appraiseis 
We next examine paragraph two to deter 
mine if it sets forth a right of first refusal or 
an option to purchase and to determine the 
effect of Leventis s letter concerning Jimmy 
Brown's offer undei paragraph two Parag 
raph two requires Leventis to inform G G A 
of any bona fide offers she ieceives and the 
price at which she is willing to sell the prop 
erty Thus, if a third party proposes an offer 
and Leventis accepts thai offer Leventis is 
obliged to first inform G G A of the offer 
and permit G G A ninety days within which 
to agree to purchase the proper!) it the 
offered and accepted price Pan of th<. conf 
usion in this ease appears to stem from use of 
the word option" in paragriph two 
Howevei, it appears that the first paragraph 
of Article XIV grants an option to purchase 
I 1 \M ADVA 
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while the second paragraph provides a right of 
first refusal Therefore the plain meaning of 
option" as used in paragraph two is not the 
usual technical legal definition, but describes 
an alternative right to purchase the property 
upon the offered and accepted terms and 
conditions of a third party, a right of first 
refusal Furthermore, the word option has 
been interpreted in at least one other contract 
to actually denote a right of first refusal See 
Cumnungs v Nitlson, 42 Utah 15 7, 129 p 
619 621 (1913) Finally, the last sentence in 
paragraph two lends further credence to the 
notion that the first paragraph or 'aforesaid' 
portion of Article XIV describes an option, 
while the second paragraph of Article XIV 
"herein" specifies a right of first refusal 
Accordingly, paragraph two gives G G A a 
right of first refusal and limits Leventis's right 
to dispose of the property in that she is com 
pclled to permit G G A ninety days to e^er 
use its right of first refusal 
Applying paragraph two lo the facts oi tins 
case, it is clear that Leventis's letter of Sept 
ember \Sf 1986 triggered G G A ' s right to 
purchase the property on the same terms as 
Brown proposed, l e , for $210,000 Leventis 
clearly received and accepted an offer from a 
third party and informed G G A of that 
offei In accordance with the lease, G G A 
then had ninety days to exercise its right of 
first refusal On Decembei 6, 1986, G G \ 
timely exercised its right of first rtfu il 
onsequently, the trial couit properl) qrant d 
ummary judgement in favor of G G A 
ATIGRNF! M ES \ND * GS1S 
Ltventis also contends that the trial court 
erred m awarding G G A attorney fees and 
costs Attorney fees are generally recoverable 
in Utah if provided for by contract E > 
Dixie State Bank v Bracken 764 P hi l) 
988 (Utah 1988) 
The lease in this case provides that if land 
lord or tenant is required to resort to litigation 
on account of any breach, the successful party 
shall recover all costs and expenses including 
reasonable attorney fees paid or incurred in 
onnection with the litigation Therefore, 
because the contract clearly provides that 
G G A is entitled to recover attorney fees and 
(osts if successful, the court properly awarded 
attorney fees and costs Id at 991 ("if reaso 
liable fees are recoverable by contract or 
statute it is a mistake of law to award less 
than that amount ) 
G G A is also entitled to attorney fees and 
costs incurred on appeal, as the contract pro 
vision includes both trial and appeal fees and 
costs Jenkins v Bailey, 676 P 2d 391, 393 
(Utah 1984) We remand to the trial court for 
a detenninition of attorney fees incurred o i 
appeal 
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OPINION 
JREENWOOD, Judge: 
Charles Floyd brought this action seeking 
amages against defendants resulting from 
llegedly unnecessary surgery. The trial court 
ranted summary judgment for all defendants, 
ating that Floyd's claims were barred by the 
atute of limitations set forth in Utah Code 
jm. §78-14-4 (1987). The court stated 
lat Floyd discovered, or through the exercise 
f reasonable diligence should have discov-
ed, more than two years before he comme-
ced the action, that he had sustained an 
tjury and that the injury was caused by neg-
gent action. We affirm. 
After experiencing severe heartburn for 
lany years and consulting at least two doctors 
bout the problem, Floyd consulted Dr. 
/ilcox in November 1981. Dr. Wilcox exam-
led Floyd, told him that he had a hiatal 
»rnia and referred him to Dr. Lindem for 
lrgery to correct the problem. Floyd met with 
gical Associates, Inc. 
iciv Rep 69 ; 6 9 
Dr. Lindem and discussed possible hiatal 
hernia surgery only. Dr. Lindem told him the 
hernia was a tear between the esophagus and 
the stomach and the surgical process would 
entail pulling the stomach up over the esoph-
agus and tying it in. Neither Dr. Lindem nor 
Dr. Wilcox told Floyd that he had ulcers. On 
December 8, Dr. Lindem's nurse asked Floyd 
to sign a consent form authorizing the surgery. 
According to .Floyd, the consent form stated 
that the proposed medical treatment was hiatal 
hernia surgery only. 
On December 9, 1981', Dr, Lindem condu-
cted three surgical procedures on Floyd: 1) 
hiatal hernia surgery, also called fundoplica-
tion; 2) a vagotomy, which is severance of the 
stomach nerves to reduce stomach secretions 
and correct ulcer disease; and 3) pylorplasty, 
which enlarges the opening from the stomach 
to the duodenum to allow the contents of the 
stomach to empty more rapidly. At the time 
Floyd was discharged from the hospital, he 
told Dr. Lindem he had diarrhea and Dr. 
Lindem said that it would go away in time. 
Over the next few months Floyd's diarrhea 
became worse, his stomach was upset almost 
continuously, he was depressed and began to 
lose weight. In about March or April 1982, 
Floyd's wife asked Dr. Lindem what he had 
done to Floyd. At that time, Dr. Lindem told 
Floyd and his wife that he had performed 
additional surgery. According to Floyd, Dr. 
Lindem stated that he had repaired the hernia, 
removed a portion of his stomach that was 
covered with ulcer scars, and cut the nerves in 
his stomach and opened up the bottom of his 
stomach so he could process food faster. Dr. 
Lindem also stated that it might take two or 
three years for Floyd to recover. During his 
deposition, Floyd testified that in March or 
April of 1982, he learned for the first time 
that Dr. Lindem had performed surgery he 
had never discussed with him and to which he 
had not consented. Floyd also stated that he 
understood at that time that the unconsented 
to surgery caused his diarrhea, upset stomach, 
weight loss and depression. Later in the dep-
osition, however, Floyd indicated that he did 
not fully realize at that time that Dr. Lindem 
had done something that Floyd had not aut-
horized. 
In September 1982, Floyd consulted Dr. 
Wilcox regarding his ongoing diarrhea, upset 
stomach and depression. Floyd stated during 
his deposition, that he informed Dr. Wilcox at 
that time that Dr. Lindem had performed 
surgery in addition to fundoplication and that 
his problems were prbbably caused by the 
surgery. Dr. Wilcox confirmed that additional 
surgery was performed, ran tests on Floyd and 
determined that he had "dumping syndrome," 
a condition in which the stomach empties 
about ten minutes after eating instead of 77 
minutes as with an average stomach. Dr. 
Wilcox told Floyd that dumping syndrome 
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